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Abstract 
In 2010, the US Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) announced a 4-year forecasting 
“tournament”. Five collaborative research teams are attempting to outperform a baseline opinion pool in 
predicting hundreds of geopolitical, economic and military events. We are contributing to one of these teams by 
eliciting forecasts from Delphi-style groups in the US and Australia. We elicit probabilities of outcomes for 3-5 
monthly questions, such as: Will Australia formally transfer uranium to India by 1 June 2012? Participants 
submit probabilities in a 3-step interval format, view those of others in their group, share, rate and discuss 
information, and then make a second private judgement. Performance is assessed using Brier scores. 
After Year 1, we ranked second of five teams in the competition. The Brier scores from the US Delphi groups 
improved on the baseline scores by 10%, the prediction market operated by our team in the US beat the baseline 
by 47%, and the Australian Delphi groups outperformed the baseline by 51% (answering different, matched 
questions to the US groups). The Australian groups were more socially and demographically diverse than the US 
groups. Group diversity may be an important factor determining the forecasting performance of the aggregated 
predictions. 
Keywords 
Delphi method, forecasting, judgement, subjective probability, uncertainty 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the Intelligence Game?  
 
The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) is an initiative of the US Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence. In 2010, IARPA announced a program called ACE (Aggregative Contingent 
Estimation), which aims "to dramatically enhance the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of forecasts for a 
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broad range of event types, through the development of advanced techniques that elicit, weight, and combine the 
judgments of many intelligence analysts." The project takes the form of a “competition” involving five groups, 
each of which must outperform a baseline opinion pool in predicting hundreds of geopolitical, economic and 
military events, over a four year period. Failing to beat the baseline could potentially result in elimination. 
Through the Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA) at the University of Melbourne, we 
are contributing to one of these teams, led by colleagues at George Mason University in the US. Our joint team 
is called DAGGRE—or Decomposition-Based Elicitation & Aggregation. ACERA’s role is to elicit forecasts 
from groups in the US and Australia using a structured Delphi-style iterative elicitation process. In the first year 
of the competition, we ran four groups in Australia and three in the US, each containing 6-10 participants. In 
Year 2, we are running ten groups (five in each country), with 15-20 participants in each. 
Why is this important?  
Unfortunately, empirical evidence suggests that political experts are not particularly good at predicting the 
future–performing only marginally better than random chance (Tetlock, 2005). Until now, there has been no 
systematic check on the accuracy of Intelligence forecasts, and there is little evidence that forecasts from the 
Intelligence community would be any better than those of the political experts. Poor forecasts might arise from 
‘overpredicting’, leading to false positives (or falsely anticipating an outcome, such as finding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction), and ‘underpredicting’, leading to false negatives (or failing to anticipate an event, such as 9/11). 
Together, these errors may result in “accountability ping pong” (Tetlock & Mellers, 2011), where Intelligence 
analysts are blamed for an error in one direction and overcompensate in the other direction. The absence of a 
reliable, structured approach to elicitation and aggregation allows for these biases to emerge in forecasts. 
How can we improve forecasts?  
Mitigating biases with well-structured elicitation 
Three well-studied cognitive biases typically lead our thinking astray. They include overconfidence—where 
people think they know more than they actually do—confirmation bias—where people seek evidence that 
confirms a pre-existing belief—and anchoring—where people rely too heavily on some implicitly suggested 
reference point (such as a number contained in the question description) (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). 
We structure our elicitation to minimise these biases in two ways: (a) by using a 3-step question format that asks 
for the (i) highest probability, (ii) lowest probability, and (iii) best guess, and (b) by engaging participants in a 
Delphi-style judgement iteration process (see Methods). 
Empirical findings from cognitive psychology underpin our 3-step question format (Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010). 
Dividing the question into multiple steps improves the chances that people will think about different kinds of 
evidence (Soll & Klayman, 2004). This helps avoid answers that are too precise, that is, intervals that are too 
narrow. Focussing on reasons that make an event likely when answering the ‘highest’ probability question and 
conversely, focussing on reasons that make an event unlikely when answering the ‘lowest’ probability helps to 
overcome confirmation bias and reduces overconfidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). Question 
order also affects judgments. Starting with a single best guess leads to anchoring, where participants tend to 
simply add or subtract 10% (for example) to answer (i) and (ii). This produces intervals that are overly narrow, 
compared with when the interval is elicited first (Soll & Klayman, 2004). 
We implement elicitation via a modified Delphi method, a procedure developed in the mid 1940s to improve 
forecasting about technology during the Cold War. A standard Delphi process involves a small group of experts 
who provide forecasts over two or more rounds. Between rounds, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary 
of the experts’ forecasts together with reasons behind their judgments. Experts can revise their forecasts in 
subsequent rounds (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). Our groups are not anonymous, to facilitate more direct 
discussion. 
In viewing the summary of individual group members’ forecasts, participants are receiving feedback about 
group variability and the group average. Comparing their own judgments with the group average in itself can 
improve estimation performance (Wintle, Fidler, Vesk, & Moore, 2012). Observing variability might also lead 
to interesting discussion points: Why might one individual’s probability be so much higher or lower than the 
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rest of the group? Why are some individuals’ intervals so precise and others so wide? Do those individuals have 
special knowledge that could benefit the group? 
Using group wisdom 
An important component of our approach is to focus on groups, rather than individuals. Under the right 
conditions, groups lend the powerful quality of ‘collective intelligence’ (Surowiecki, 2005). However, groups 
frequently fail to outperform the average of individual judgments (for a review, see Hastie, 1986; Kerr & 
Tindale, 2011). Group judgments may be prone to ‘group think’ (Janis, 1982), where groups make more 
extreme and risky judgments than would individuals, and they also tend to become overconfident (Sniezek, 
1992). Groups can also be dominated by extroverts, rather than experts (Bonner, Sillito, & Baumann, 2007) and 
led astray by ‘halo-effects’ (Thorndike, 1920), where the most experienced or charismatic person is uncritically 
followed by the other group members.  
To our surprise, the prognosis in recent research is not so bleak. The positive effect of group interaction is 
especially clear in quantitative judgement tasks (Schultze, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2012), such as estimating 
the outcome of sporting events and elections—as opposed to brainstorming and creative tasks. Under certain 
conditions, negotiated group judgments (behavioural aggregation) can even outperform averaged individual 
judgments (mathematical aggregation) (Bonner & Baumann, 2012). 
So what conditions might best utilise the wisdom of the crowd? First, elicitation should be structured to 
minimise perverse outcomes of group dynamics. For example, anonymity of initial assessments in Delphi 
groups may reduce ‘halo-effects’. Second, the question must be difficult enough so that individual judgments 
err. Otherwise, an individual judgement would be sufficient. Third, the group should be sufficiently diverse 
(Page, 2008) so that biases are roughly evenly distributed either side of the ‘true value’. That is, the errors of 
individuals cancel each other out. Within the specific context of intelligence and crisis management, Hackman 
(2011) outlined six factors that led to improved group decision making: (i) Being a ‘real team’ (the importance 
of using an existing intact social system), (ii) Having a compelling purpose, (iii) The right people, (iv) Clear 
norms of conduct, (v) A supportive organisational environment and (vi) Team-focussed coaching—the 
importance of group facilitation. 
Studies of group forecasts suggest that group structuring (Ang & O'Connor, 1991), group technique used 
(Sniezek, 1989), and method of combining different views (Kerr & Tindale, 2011; Önkal, Lawrence, & Sayım, 
2011) all influence group performance. While the benefits of mathematical versus behavioural aggregation will 
vary with the task, we believe that there is good evidence to support the use of group interaction under the right 
conditions. 
METHODS 
Participants  
In Year 1 of the competition, we recruited and established four groups in Australia and three in the US, each 
containing 6-10 participants. The only requirement for participation was an interest in world affairs. Most 
participants (85%) held university degrees. We balanced gender, age, discipline and occupation across the 
Australian groups, in an attempt to maximise diversity in each. In Year 2, we are running ten groups with a total 
of 172 participants. In addition to balancing groups according to the demographics of participants, they are also 
composed to capture a range of political ideologies (using a Worldview questionnaire, Tetlock, 2005) and 
cognitive styles (using a Styles of Reasoning questionnaire, also developed by Tetlock, 2005). The introduction 
of an online tool has also broadened the geographic scope of participants. In Year 2, three groups will be run as 
homogenous control groups (same age, education, geographic location) to test against the performance of the 
diverse groups. 
 
Procedure 
 
Each month, IARPA releases a list of questions about current global affairs—for example, Will the Taliban 
begin official in-person negotiations with either the US or Afghan government by 1 April 2012? Questions are 
phrased so they will resolve, one way or another, within a given time frame, usually anywhere from a few 
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months to a couple of years. This allows for empirical testing of forecasting performance against actual events 
within a reasonable time period. 
 
Each group answers 3–5 questions each month. In Year 1, the US groups answered a selection of IARPA 
questions, while the Australian groups answered non-IARPA questions matched to the IARPA questions in 
terms of time, structure and context. In Year 2, all Delphi groups are receiving questions from the same pool. 
Participants typically spend about 2-3 hours per month on their forecasts, and are not required to answer every 
question. 
All questions assessed by the Delphi groups in Year 1 were binary, phrased to resolve as ‘yes’ (1), if the event in 
question occurred, or ‘no’ (0), if the event did not occur.  IARPA also releases conditional and ordinal 
questions, some of which we are trialling in Year 2, though for the purposes of this paper we will focus on the 
standard binary questions. 
The question format  
For each question, we elicit interval probabilities of the event occurring, using a structured 3-step question 
format: 
Example Question: Will Australia formally transfer Uranium to India by 1 June 2013? 
(i) When you think of reasons that make this likely to happen, how sure do you feel that Australia will 
formally transfer Uranium to India by this date? 
 
The highest probability of this occurring is: ___________ 
 
(Please answer with a percentage 0-100%) 
 
(ii) When you think of reasons that make this unlikely to happen, how sure do you feel that Australia 
will formally transfer Uranium to India by this date? 
 
The lowest probability of this occurring is: ____________ 
 
(Please answer with a percentage 0-100%) 
 
(iii) Finally, consider the balance of evidence. If you had to put a single figure on your opinion of this 
outcome, what would it be? 
 
My best guess is: ____________  
 
(Again, please answer with a percentage 0-100%) 
 
Participants are informed that their upper and lower bounds need not be symmetric around their best guess. 
They are also informed about the trade-off between accuracy and informativeness (Yaniv & Foster, 1997). 
Narrow intervals give us more information, but require greater skill in order to capture the truth. 
The elicitation procedure 
 
Our elicitation framework involves two rounds of judgments, separated by feedback and discussion ( 
Figure 1). It differs from the original Delphi in that we are not seeking a group consensus. Instead, we simply 
average across individual answers from Round 2. Also, the original Delphi procedure maintained complete 
anonymity of group members. In our method, people openly share information and may disclose their 
background, education and other identifying details if they so choose. The Year 2 software allows greater 
anonymity, as participants can choose an unrecognisable username ( 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the monthly question process 
 
Although the basic phases of the approach were the same for Years 1 and 2, the interface for elicitation and 
discussion was different. In Year 1, the process was managed by a group facilitator, and discussion occurred 
over a communal email list. In Year 2, participants enter their forecasts into web-based software developed for 
the project. At the same website, they share and organise information and have online discussions (Figure 2). 
 
The website automatically searches for links related to each question using search terms entered and managed 
by the facilitator based on question detail and resolution information—what constitutes ‘an outcome’—provided 
by IARPA. Participants also add their own links, and rate and comment on the usefulness of all links. 
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Figure 2. Interval probability judgments from Round 1 are displayed back to each group, links to useful 
websites are recommended, and discussion takes place below it (not shown). 
Measuring performance  
Performance is evaluated by comparing the time-matched Brier Scores (Brier, 1950) of the Delphi groups with 
those of the baseline “ULinOP” (unweighted linear opinion pool of analyst estimates) and with the DAGGRE 
prediction market, operated by our team in the US. 
A Brier Score is a measure of the long term accuracy of estimated probabilities that a given event will occur. 
Specifically, it measures the mean squared error of a set of probability judgments relative to the observed 
outcomes, and ranges from 0 (best) to 2 (worst).  
For a set of 𝑁𝑁 forecasting instances, each with C possible outcomes (in the case of binary events, C = 2), the 
Brier Score (BS) is calculated as: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 1
𝑁𝑁
���𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �
2𝐶𝐶
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  
where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the probability that was forecast for outcome 𝑖𝑖 for event 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is 1 if outcome 𝑖𝑖 eventuates and 0 
otherwise.  
Predictions in the ACE competition were submitted daily by each competing team over the period for which a 
question was unresolved. Average Brier Scores for the daily predictions were used to assess performance on 
individual questions. As the Delphi forecasts are given at a snapshot in time, performance relative to the 
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ULinOP and DAGGRE market was assessed as the mean daily Brier scores over the 10 day period ending at the 
close of Round 2 for the month in which a particular question was assessed (Figure 3).   
Overall competitor performance on all questions was assessed as the mean of the individual question Brier 
Scores, and as the Percentage Difference of Mean (PDM) Brier Scores relative to the ULinOP. In addition, to 
assess the progression in relative performance, the cumulative differences in Brier Scores were also calculated: 
CumDiff(𝑡𝑡) = 1
𝑇𝑇
��𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶 �
𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇
𝑞𝑞=1  
where 𝑞𝑞 = 1, …𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇  is the set of questions answered by time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞  is the mean Brier Score for the set of 
predictions made for question 𝑞𝑞.  
 
Figure 3. ‘Instantaneous’ US Delphi group estimates reflect a snapshot in time, compared to the continuous 
DAGGRE prediction market and ULinOP estimates for a single question. 
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RESULTS 
Delphi groups performed well, evaluated against DAGGRE prediction market estimates and the linear opinion 
pool (ULinOP) (Figure 3 & 4). At the April 2011 close for Year 1, the US Delphi groups had outperformed the 
ULinOP Brier scores by 10%. The Australian Delphi groups outperformed the ULinOP Brier scores by 51%. 
The cumulative Brier scores for the Australian Delphi groups were initially outperforming the DAGGRE 
market, but dropped behind it in March. 
 
 
Figure 4. Performance of Delphi groups and DAGGRE prediction market (against ULinOP Brier scores), by 
question assessment date. Measured as both cumulative Brier Score difference (lines) and Percentage 
Difference of Mean (PDM) Brier Scores relative to the ULinOP (higher difference means better performance). 
The early termination of the AUS line results from fewer questions resolving for those groups in the March 
(final) rounds. 
 
Average responses among Australian groups and among those in the US were quite similar, and hence similarly 
accurate (Figure 5), despite very different patterns of individual responses within groups (Figure 6). 
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Figure 5.  Performance of individual Delphi groups and prediction market (against ULinOP Brier scores). 
Measured as cumulative Brier Score difference (lines) and Percentage Difference of Mean (PDM) Brier Scores. 
Higher difference means better performance. The early termination of the AUS line results from fewer questions 
resolving for those groups in the March (final) rounds. 
 
Figure 6. Patterns of individual responses within groups are quite different, despite very similar group averages 
(bold) between groups. 
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Figure 7. No relationship was detected between age of participants and their average Brier scores 
Delphi group results from Year 1 indicate that individual performance does not correlate with cognitive style, 
age, experience or any other demographic factor that we recorded (e.g. Figure 7). 
For those who revised their judgments, second round estimates outperformed first round estimates by 23% 
(Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. For those who revised their judgments, Round 2 forecasts improved on Round 1 forecasts  
(95% CIs, higher Brier Scores denote greater error). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Group interaction 
 
Despite a large literature about groups as a decision making instrument, the results are inconclusive on whether 
discussion is good or bad for formulating group judgments (Wright & Rowe, 2011). The popular view since the 
80s has been that mathematical aggregation of individual estimates in a group is preferable to behavioural 
aggregation (Armstrong, 2001; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Hastie, 1986), because social interaction during 
consensus-seeking exposes the group to biases that erode the quality of the overall judgement, such as group 
think (Janis, 1982) and information cascades (Sunstein, 2011). A recent high profile paper (Lorenz, Rauhut, 
Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011) suggests that even minimal social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd 
effect. Yet, discussion also offers the potential to improve group performance. It can resolve misunderstanding 
of the question, and provides an opportunity for people to introduce new information and learn from each other. 
Our results indicate that discussion improves forecasting performance of group averages, given that second 
round estimates outperformed the first. Discussions may improve group performance by drawing out hidden 
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information (Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2010; Stasser & Titus, 2003), encouraging critical thinking (Postmes, 
Spears, & Cihangir, 2001) and counter-factual reasoning (Galinsky & Kray, 2003), and displaying and resolving 
differential motivational contingencies (Önkal, et al., 2011).  
 
It would also be interesting to test whether second round forecasts improve beyond that which would be 
expected from averaging two judgments from a single individual, without interaction (4% points in Herzog & 
Hertwig, 2009). The improvement with discussion in our study certainly appears to be larger, at least for 
participants who revised their Round 2 judgments (23%, Figure 8). 
Diversity 
 
Previous studies, together with results from this research, have found that single variables (e.g. age or gender) 
don’t tend to correlate with forecasting performance of individuals, except for a moderate correlation between 
cognitive style and calibration (Tetlock, 2005). The best predictor of good forecasting may be performance on 
previous questions (e.g. Cooke, 1991). In other words, we have no reliable way to distinguish—before the 
fact—good judges from bad ones. However, diversity across these variables may lead to better forecasting 
performance of groups (Page, 2008), on the one hand because biases in different directions cancel each other out 
in the group average, but also because individual members of a diverse group bring different perspectives and 
information, and ignite interesting debates. 
Although we didn’t empirically test diversity in Year 1, the US Delphi groups were less demographically and 
socially diverse than the Australian groups, which may have been a factor in the higher performance of the 
Australian groups. By comparing diverse groups with homogenous control groups for both countries in Year 2, 
we will directly test whether the composition of groups affects forecast accuracy. 
Theoretically, it has been shown that the benefit of groups is greatest where the overlap between the knowledge 
bases of individual members is least (i.e. members possess independent knowledge) (Clemen & Winkler, 1985). 
Selecting for member diversity using information on demographics, experience, worldview and cognitive 
reasoning style may be one way to reduce dependency between members. Our results showed different patterns 
of individual responses within groups (Figure 6), yet averages were still very consistent between groups, even 
when judgments diverged from the actual outcome. It could be that groups accessed similar information, 
resulting in correlated judgments. We will explore the effect of correlated information sources in Year 2 by 
tracking information use in the dedicated search software for each group. 
Improving Intelligence  
Results suggest that our Delphi-style groups have the capacity to considerably outperform the simple 
aggregations (e.g. the ULinOP), offering an alternative framework for predicting the sorts of events that interest 
governments and policy makers. A noticeable feature with our Year 1 design was that final forecasts were 
generally submitted early in the time period allotted for prediction. While early predictions have value, the lack 
of later predictions prevented the assessment of performance at dates closer to the resolution point. Generally, 
forecasts become easier as resolution approaches, reflected in the high performance of the continuous prediction 
market just prior to the question resolving (Figure 3). It is not clear why the continuous ULinOP forecasts did 
not perform similarly well at this time, although it is possible that their judgments were not continually updated, 
similar to the Delphi groups. To address this, Year 2 is introducing ‘continuous’ questions which remain open 
for an extended time. These may be compared more directly to the performance of the ULinOP and prediction 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
The elicitation format and Delphi-style group procedure that we have developed for the Intelligence Game are 
performing well, compared with methods tested by other teams in the forecasting tournament, and compared 
with the baseline. Our results also add to growing evidence that group interaction under the right conditions 
improves forecasts, and group diversity may be an important factor determining the forecasting performance of 
aggregated predictions. Forthcoming results from Year 2 will provide more insights into the role of group 
diversity and test the robustness of the 3-step method for eliciting conditional probabilities and ordinal 
judgments. 
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